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WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE PROMOTION OF
DIPLOMACY WITHIN AN ADJUDICATIVE MODEL
TREVOR LAWSONt

In his article, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers
Triumph over Diplomats, Michael K. Young argues that the dispute
resolution mechanisms embodied in the Understanding on the
1
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes are a
"decisive, though imperfect step in the direction of a more
legalistic, adjudicatory process." 2 Young is not alone among
commentators in viewing the movement towards a more legalistic
system as a "victory" over those who prefer a system "characterized
3
by consultations, negotiations and diplomatic compromise."
It seems, however, that such an interpretation of the dispute
resolution mechanisms produced by the Uruguay Round is only
reasonable if one first accepts that adjudication is a distinct and
separate instrument from a diplomatic approach. Moreover, one
must also accept that it is not only exclusive in its application, but
that it is devoid of the traditionally diplomatic exercises of
consultation, negotiation and compromise. It is the purpose of this
comment to show that the distinction between adjudication and
diplomacy is false. The traditional diplomatic concepts of
negotiation, consultation and compromise in fact flourish under a
properly developed adjudication-based system of dispute
resolution.

B.A. (McMaster), LLB. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie).
Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (wTo), one of three components of the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (1994), 33 I.L.M. 112 [hereinafter
the Understanding]. Came into force on January l, 1995.
2
M. K. Young, "Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph
Over Diplomats" (1994) 29 Int'!. Law. 389 at 397.
3
Ibid. at 390.
t
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This comment will initially identify what is generally agreed
upon as the goal of dispute resolution within the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) regime. Secondly, the two approaches
historically associated with the debate as to how the objectives of
dispute resolution within the GATT/WTO are best achieved, that of
the legalist and that of the pragmatic or diplomatic approach, will
be examined. Thirdly, it will be established that these two positions
can be reconciled under a single model which employs adjudication
as the ultimate arbiter of disputes, examining the civil justice
system and its operation within the United States as an
embodiment of the adjudicative model. Finally, it will be
established that the Understanding reflects many qualities of the
American approach to the resolution of domestic disputes. The
movement in the Understanding toward the establishment of a
system of dispute resolution in which the legalist and diplomatic
approaches may be reconciled within an adjudicative model, for
example, is very similar to the American approach. This movement,
when properly understood, is not a victory of legalists over
diplomats, but marks the creation of a more efficient and fair
system better able to fulfill the long-standing objective of
GATT/WTO dispute resolution procedures.

I. THE OBJECTIVE OF GATT/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
It is generally agreed that the primary objective of dispute
resolution under the GATT/WTO is to facilitate the withdrawal or
termination of any measure which serves to compromise the balance
of advantage provided by the GA TT to its contracting parties.
Moreover, it seeks to do so in an expeditious manner which protects
4
and restores this balance. If at all possible, resolution should take
place between the principals, through a process of bilateral
consultations and conciliation; rather than by retaliation and
counter-retaliation. Overall, the underlying objective is the greater
goal of continual progress towards liberalization through the

4

0. Long, Law and its Limitations in the CATT Multilateral Trade System
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) at 71.
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5

elimination of barriers to international trade. This objective has
remained a consistent feature of GATT dispute resolution since its
inception in 1947, and continues to be the underlying premise
behind the rules and procedures adopted in the Understanding.
Agreement on how best to achieve this primary objective has
not remained consistent, however. A fundamental ideological
debate among member nations has persisted as to whether the GATT
should be "primarily a legal document with provisions for judicial
determination and penalties for violations, or a set of guidelines for
realizing mutually agreed objectives through consultation and
6
mediation." GATT members are divided into two camps in terms
of how the objectives of the dispute resolution process are best
achieved: the legalists and the pragmatists or diplomats. As the
following section reveals, neither camp has been predominate:
instead, "over the forty years of GATT dispute settlement, there has
7
been an ebb and flow between the ... models."
II. LEGALISM VERSUS DIPLOMACY: TAKING
SIDES IN PURSUIT OF THE OBJECTIVE, 1947-86
1. Diplomacy: The Pragmatic Approach
When the GATT was established, it lacked a single, concisely defined
general dispute mechanism equivalent to the adjudicative "threestep" process developed under the International Trade
8
Organization (ITo). The vaguely worded Articles XXII
(Consultation) and XXIII (Nullification and Impairment) of the
GATT were left to serve as the basis of dispute settlement. Article
XXII establishes a general commitment to "accord sympathetic
consideration" in consultation with another member regarding
"such representations as may be made by another contracting

5
F. Stone, Canada, the CATT and the International Trade System, 2nd ed.
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1992) at 36.
6
R. F. Mikesell, "Antecedents of the ITO Charter and their Relevance for the
Uruguay Round" (1994) 14 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 323 at 328-329.
7
A. F. Lowenfeld, "Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GATT" (1994) 88 Am.]. Int'! L. 477 at 479.
8
Discussed in greater detail, infta note 17, and associated commentary.
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party." Article XXII(2) asserts the competence of the contracting
parties to intervene in the matter upon request of the aggrieved
party.
Article XXIII applies to both violation and non-violation
disputes. Following the failure of bilateral negotiations, the
contracting parties, upon request, are required to promptly
investigate the dispute. Appropriate recommendations are to be
made to the concerned parties. However, the GA TT lacked a
formalized body to carry out these tasks. In the absence of a solid
foundation of rules and procedures to govern the resolution of
disputes, the GATT dispute resolution mechanism at its inception
was decisively diplomatic in nature, dependent on the co-operation
of both principals in the settlement of a dispute.
The diplomatic process is "most clearly in operation when states
are negotiating with each other to achieve peaceful settlement of a
10
dispute or agreement on a matter of mutual concern." What the
pragmatic approach to dispute resolution entails in terms of
GATTIWTO dispute settlement is addressed by Young:
dispute resolution should not be particularly
formal, legal or adjudicatory. Rather, it should be
characterized by consultations, negotiations and diplomatic
compromises. The goal of dispute resolution in the GATT
context should not be to create clear-cut, binding rules or
rigourous applications of the law. Instead, the process
should be designed to end the dispute by ending the
violation as soon as possible. Given the sovereign nature
of the complainants, this goal is best accomplished
through careful negotiations and appropriate
compromise. [emphasis added] 11
GATT

At the centre of the pragmatist's criticism of using legalistic
methods lies the concern that a propensity to accentuate
adjudication may in fact result in a heightening of conflicts, as

9

P. Hallstrom, The GATT Panels and the Formation of International Trade

Law (Stockholm: Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social

Sciences, 1994) at 213.
10
I. Claude Jr., "Mulrilateralism" in E. Plischke, ed., Modern Diplomacy: The
Art and the Artisans (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1974) at 190.
11
Young, supra note 2 at 390.

WTO

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

325

opposed to their resolution. There are three arguments underlying
12
this concern. First, it is argued that an increased effort to
judicialize a proceeding may backfire if losing members refuse the
wTo's attempts to enforce its decisions, thus undermining the other
members' faith in the entire system. Secondly, it is argued that
negotiation between nations, the traditional method of
international dispute resolution, could be undermined by
ineffective adjudication. Once proceedings have ended and a party
ignores the final decision, an attempt to bring that party back to the
negotiating table may be more difficult, especially after retaliation
is authorized. Finally, it is argued that adjudication can lead to a
deepening of hostility between disputing parties because the process
is naturally contentious, firmly placing each nation on opposite
sides of the dispute. Pragmatists argue that this is in contrast with
the more traditional methods of negotiation and conciliation,
which attempt to found a solution on common ground. Hudec
suggests that the use of judges and lawyers in the dispute resolution
process was consciously avoided from the beginning of the GATT as
the "problem with lawyers and judges was their failure to
13
understand the need for compromise in these matters."

2. Legalism: The Rule Oriented Approach
The term "legalism" as it is understood in the context of the GATT
relates to a theory that disputes between nations are best resolved
through the use of a formalistic, rule-oriented approach, in which
14
disputes among member states are resolved through adjudication.
Advocates of the theory argue that it serves to lessen an individual
nation's reliance on their relative economic and political power-the
15
·
temptat10n
to "fl ex one ' s muse1es " -an d act um·1 atera11y. As a
result, this process provides an advantage to smaller and lessdeveloped countries, who wield little economic and political power,
and thus lack the leverage necessary to obtain a favourable

12

T. Dillon Jr., "The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?" (1995) 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 349 at 396-97.
13
R. Hudec, The CATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (New York:
Praeger, 1975) at 21.
14
Young, supra note 2 at 390.
15
K. Stiles, "The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism" (1995) 4 J.
Int'l L. and Prac. 3 at 4.
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resolution to disputes involving larger, more powerful member
states. It is further argued that a legalistic approach to dispute
resolution serves to enhance the international trading system
through increased adherence to internationally agreed rules and a
more effective dispute settlement.
Finally, the legalist perspective holds that the clarity and
certainty produced by building a credible body of GA TT
jurisprudence will increase compliance with GATT standards and
assist in staving off protectionist measures, thereby ensuring
16
reciprocity and fair trade.

3. The Evolution Toward an Adjudication-Based Model
The Havana World Trade Charter establishing the ITO provided for
a dispute resolution procedure which entailed a rule-oriented
approach. Dispute resolution under the ITO involved a three-step
procedure, by which complaints were to be investigated and ruled
upon by an eighteen-member Executive Board.17 Rulings of the
Executive Board could be appealed to the ITo's highest political
organ, the Conference, which in turn could be appealed to the
International Court of Justice. Guided by this system, the ITO
18
could give a non-binding ruling to the principals of the conflict.
The effectiveness of this legalistic approach to dispute resolution
was never tested, however, due to the failure of the u.s. Congress to
ratify the Havana Charter.
Although the GA TT itself lacked a concise institutional
framework for dispute settlement, the practice of referring disputes
to working parties was adopted early on, beginning the evolution of
the GATT towards an adjudicative model. The working party was
comprised of members of the two principal nations to the dispute,
representatives of nations interested in the outcome, and
representatives from neutral countries. The working parties were
never intended to render decisions on legal issues: "they were meant
to clarify the issues, to discuss them, and hopefully produce
19
enlightened agreement on the merits." Despite the involvement of
third parties, the working parties were decisively diplomatic in the
16

Young, supra note 2 at 390.
Hallstrom, supra note 9 at 28.
18
Ibid. at 28.
19 Hudec, supra note 13 at 69.

17
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sense that there would be no settlement without the agreement of
the principals.
In 1952, at the seventh session of the contracting parties,
evolution towards an adjudication based system continued. The
working party model was replaced by the "panel" process. The term
"panel" was seen to evoke "notions of impartial and non-political
decisions by individuals acting in their own capacity, chosen for
20
their technical expertise." At the same time, the submissions
presented by the principal parties to a dispute also appear to have
become more legalized: written arguments were prepared in
advance; the meeting room resembled a court room; oral
arguments were carefully prepared; and the panels both questioned
the parties and rendered a written decision. Despite this
appearance, however, the success of the entire process remained
21
dependent on the voluntary co-operation of the parties.
Throughout the first decade of its existence, the GATT made
legal rulings on twenty of the fifty-three complaints that were filed
22
under it. However, this highly visible activity subsided after 1958,
as only seven complaints were filed, and five rulings made, during
23
the next decade. Several reasons have been advanced to explain
why member-nations stopped initiating complaints under the GATT
dispute settlement procedures. The main explanations have
centered on the inability of the rules and procedures, as they
existed at that time, to satisfactorily fulfill the objectives of the
24
GATT dispute settlement process.
While initially effective, these
procedures were no longer considered adequate to deal with
increasingly complex trade issues, which had not been envisioned
25
when the GATT was first established.
Among other things, the consultative phase was viewed as being
unproductively long, as the party whose measures were challenged
could drag out the bilateral discussions on the selection of panelists,
the terms of reference, and the procedures for making submissions
20

Hudec, supra note 13 at 75.
Ibid. at 77.
22
R. Hudec, "The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement", in M. Hart &
D. Steger, eds., In Whose Interest?: Due Process and Transparency in International
Trade (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1992) at 11.
23
Ibid.
24
Long, supra note 4 at 86-87.
25 Hallstrom, supra note 9 at 40.
21
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to the panel. Furthermore, a single contracting party, including
the disputant who was adversely affected by a decision, could block
the adoption of a report by the GATT Council. Even if a report was
adopted, there was no monitoring process in place to ensure that
the offending measure was withdrawn, and no guarantee that an
27
adverse party would adhere to the ruling.
The evolution of GATT dispute resolution towards a more
legalistic model continued in the 1979 Tokyo Round of
negotiations, that led to the Understanding Regarding Notification,
28
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. The
Understanding of 1979 attempted to respond to some of the
perceived weaknesses of the GATT dispute resolution mechanisms by
mandating time limits within which a panel was to be formed,
formalizing the principles governing the composition of the
complaint, and stating that the report of a panel must be adopted
within a "reasonable" amount of time.
The Understanding of 1979 failed, however, to respond to the
greatest weakness of the GATT dispute resolution process: the party
whose conduct was at issue could impede the process at many
stages. As well, the composition and powers of the panel were not
clarified in any substantial respect. The language used to modify
the existing procedures, such as "reasonable," provided little of the
clarity and precision such rules and procedures require if an
adjudication-based dispute settlement process is to operate
29
effectively.
Evidence of the failure of the Understanding of 1979 to
accomplish its goals can be found in the continued reliance of the
United States on unilateral action throughout the 1980's. In
particular, the u.s. relied upon section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974,
which authorized the imposition of or increase in tariffs,
quantitative restrictions, or both, in response to unfair or injurious
26

J. Bello & A. Homer, "u.s. Trade Law and Policy Series No.24: Dispute
Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits" in
H. Applebaum & L. Schlitt, eds., The Gatt, the WTO and the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act: Understanding the Fundamental Changes (New York: Practicing
Law Institute, 1995) at 462.
27
Ibid.
28
(1980), B.I.S.D., 26th Supp. at 210 [hereinafter the Understanding of1979].
29
See also Article 4, which stated that consultations should proceed
expeditiously, but placed no time limits upon them.
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trade practices by a foreign government. As such, section 301
provided domestic legal authority for sanctions, even in the absence
of a violation of the GATT or nullification and impairment of u.s.
30
GATT benefos. Section 301 was viewed as "a dear certification by
the u.s. Congress that the GATT legal system was not working." 31
In addition to acting unilaterally, the United States engaged in
legal "carpet-bombinJ( techniques when it was involved in a dispute
before a GATT panel. These tactics effectively served to overwhelm
GATT panels whose members were ill-prepared to respond with a
satisfactory legal judgment. Hudec notes that, "the panels decision
in the MIPS case showed how inadequate the GATT's legal resources
. t he race
c
. lawyenng.
. ,,33
were m
o f aggressive
34
The aggressive use of the Trade Act, 1974, by the United
States, coupled with several poorly constructed decisions by GATT
35
panels, served as the impetus for the major reassessment of dispute
resolution procedures which occurred during the Uruguay Round
Bello & Homer, supra note 26 at 466.
Hudec, supra note 22 at 22.
32
Ibid. at 12.
33
Ibid. While Hudec's point is certainly valid, it is perhaps more accurate to say
that the inadequacies of the GATT legal process were the cause of aggressive
lawyering. The term "aggressive" lawyering is used in this sense to mean the
employment of arguments and tactics which a qualified tribunal would be capable
of identifying as frivolous and vexatious, and would react to arguments of this
nature by identifying them as such and/or admonishing counsel who attempted to
employ such methods. The presence of a qualified adjudicatory body whose power
and authoriry are clearly defined discourages counsel from putting forth such
arguments in an attempt to overwhelm the tribunal. A qualified adjudicatory body
would not discourage aggressive lawyering in the sense of a rigourous defence of
ones position, but would only ensure that counsel is confined to the use of sound
legal argument in their submissions to the tribunal. As such, the entire process
achieves a greater degree of clarity, as counsel is better able to gauge their chances
for success based on the validity of their legal position, knowing that a capable panel
will identify and discard a weak or frivolous legal argument. Further, the
adjudication process operates more efficiently, as a better qualified adjudicatory
body will demand concise and substantive legal reasoning behind submissions from
counsel, and are less likely to be overwhelmed, and more likely to interrupt or redirect counsel who attempts to occupy the tribunal's time addressing issues not
germane to the matter at hand, meaning that a party whose behaviour is in question
will not be able to temporarily block the process through lengthy, but unsound
filibustertype argument.
34
Bello & Homer, supra note 26 at 466-67.
35 Hudec, supra note 22 at 15.
31
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of multilateral trade negotiations, launched by way of the
Ministerial Declaration at Punta del Este in 1986. This reassessment
lead to the implementation of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, the substance of
which will be addressed later. 36
It has been argued by the advocates of the diplomacy-based
approach to dispute settlement that the difficulties endured by the
GA TT dispute resolution mechanism throughout the 1970s and
19 80s were the result of the attempt to apply formalistic legal rules
to an agreement which was, and remains, essentially diplomatic in
nature. 37 It is equally plausible, however, that the reason GATT's
dispute resolution mechanisms began to falter in the 1960s was not
due to the evolution of the dispute resolution process away from a
diplomacy-based pragmatic model, towards an adjudication-based
model, but resulted from that evolution not being carried far
enough or fast enough. As a result, the full potential of an
adjudication-based system of dispute resolution could not be
brought to bear on increasingly complex disputes arising under the
GATT.
The examination of the American domestic justice system in
the following section reveals that an adjudication-based system,
when properly developed, ceases to distance itself from a
diplomacy-based system of dispute settlement, and begins to create
an environment whereby the traditional diplomatic tools of dispute
resolution-negotiation, compromise, mediation and
conciliation-flourish and become the focal points of the dispute
resolution process.

III. THE ADJUDICATION MODEL
1. The American Civil Justice System: The Adjudication Model
at Work

The United States is often perceived as an excessively litigious
nation; "sensitive to small insults and eager to convert them into
38
nasty and expensive lawsuits." One would expect that in a society

See note 63, infra, and associated commentary.
Stiles, supra note 15 at 7.
38
P. Wald, "Litigation in America" (1983) 31 UCLAL. Rev. 1at1.

36
37
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whose ideology as it pertains to the resolution of domestic disputes
so closely embraces a legalistic or adjudicatory model, the vast
majority of disputes would be resolved by a neutral tribunal
rendering a legally binding judgment following written and oral
submissions from adverse parties. However, the formal adjudicative
process represents a minute, rarely employed aspect of a much
broader scheme of dispute resolution in the u.s ..
Few cases actually receive the "full adjudicatory treatment,"
39
ending with a verdict and a judgment. Recent data collected by
the Civil Litigation Research Project from court records indicates
that only eight percent of 1,649 sampled state and federal cases
40
went to trial. Of this small percentage of cases that were not
settled before trial, many were resolved before a formal ruling was
made. It is important to note that these statistics account only for
those disputes in which a lawsuit was actually initiated. The number
of disputes which arose among parties but were settled without any
formal legal action being taken is unknown. Accordingly, it should
be remembered that while the eight percent of cases that go to trial
represents a mere fraction of all lawsuits filed, the total number of
all lawsuits represents a tiny fraction of the total number of all
.
41
d1sputes.
The above statistics indicate that much of the work undertaken
within this adjudication-based system is accomplished outside the
formal adjudication setting. Statistics suggest that mediation,
42
43
conciliation, arbitration, and negotiation are widely employed in
the resolution of disputes in civil matters within this system.
There appear to be two basic ways a court may serve to facilitate
the efficient negotiation and settlement of disputes. An
adjudicative body, by its very existence, may provide indicia for the
settlement of disputes through negotiation and compromise. Such a
role is implicit in its nature, as the court plays no active role in the
39

H.M. Kritzer, "Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray" (1986) 70
Judicature 161 at 161.
40
Ibid. at 162.
41
M. Galanter, "Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society" (1983) 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 at 12.
42
M. Galanter, "The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases"
(1986) 69 Judicature 257 at 257.
43
Kritzer, supra note 39 at 163.
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settlement. As well, the main actors of the adjudication modeljudges and lawyers-take on a more direct and explicit role in the
resolution of disputes.

i. The Implicit Impact ofan Adjudicatory Body
A court of law, by its existence as final arbiter (subject to appeal) in
the event that the parties fail to resolve the dispute amongst
themselves, may serve implicitly as indicia for the parties to come
44
to a compromised solution between themselves. Parties are more
satisfied with, and are more likely to honour, solutions they are able
to help formulate, and this factor benefits all concerned parties. 45
The fact that a court may intervene and impose a solution is viewed
as "profoundly [affecting] ... what happens at earlier stages by
providing cues, symbols, and bargaining counters which the actors
46
use in constructing (and dismantling) disputes. This implicit
effect which the presence of an adjudicative body may have in the
inducement of settlement is more fully expanded upon by
Galanter, who states:
[T]he impact of litigation cannot be equated with the
resolution of those disputes that are fully adjudicated.
Adjudication provides the background of norms and
procedures against which negotiation and regulation in
both private and governmental settings take place. This
contribution includes, but is not exhausted by,
communication to prospective litigants of what might
transpire if one of them sought a judicial resolution.
Courts ccommunicate not only the rules that would
govern adjudication of the dispute but possible remedies
and estimates of the difficulty, certainty, and cost of
. partrcu
. 1ar outcomes. 47
securing

As the power that an adjudicative body may wield in the
imposition of a decision, along with the factors that will be
considered in the formulation of that judgment become clearer,
parties involved in a dispute will be better able to assess the

44

Kritzer, supra note 39 at 162.
M. Cahill & M. Galanter, "Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and
of Settlements" (1994) 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 at 1350-51.
5
Galanter, supra note 41 at 12.
47
Ibid. at 32.
45
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likelihood of obtaining a favourable outcome. In short, the
understanding of the legal world has the effect of enhancing the
48
opportunities for compromise. Armed with knowledge of the
manner in which tribunals have dealt with past complaints involving
similar facts, parties are better able to predict what the outcome of
their case would be if brought to the point of adjudication. Such
knowledge tends to diffuse disputes, encouraging parties to reach a
mutually agreeable settlement which is not only better tailored to
meet the particular qualities of their dispute, but which also
considers and responds to those factors that would likely . be
49
neglected by a formal adjudicative ruling.

u. The Explicit Impact of the Adjudicatory Body
Lawyers and judges, as key players in the adjudicatory process, can
and do actively participate in the efficient negotiation and
settlement of disputes.

a. judges
Within an adjudication-based system of dispute resolution, the role
of the judge is not that of passive listener, or idle observer,
remaining aloof while adverse parties do battle. Judges actively
intervene in a significant portion of civil cases in American courts. 50
Within the federal judiciary, judges actively seek the promotion of
settlements among parties; ranging from the encouragement of
negotiations between the parties themselves, to the active

48

Cahill & Galanter, supra note 45 at 1387.
David Foskett, a barrister practicing in England, suggests that "procedural
rules ... are designed to identify and clarify the issues between the parties and ... to
assist thereby the ultimate resolutions of a particular dispute or disputes from which
the litigation arose" The clarity of the rules and procedures lends itself to a
predictability of outcome which is conducive, in most cases, to settlement before the
trial stage: The Law and Practice of Compromise (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1980) at 3.
5
Cahill & Galanter, supra note 45 at 1342. A nation-wide survey of 2545
Judges in the United States in 1980 revealed that approximately eighty percent of
judges were "interventionist" in the dispute settlement process, ranging from subtle
intervention through the use of cues and suggestions, to more aggressive
intervention through direct pressure on counsel. See also: A. Ryan, American Trial
judges: Their Work Styles and Performances (New York: Free Press, 1980).
49

°
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participation of a judge in arbitration, mediation and conciliation
51
processes.
The use of a judge in a conciliatory capacity is especially
beneficial when disputing parties have reached an impasse during
their own settlement discussions. Judicial conciliators can encourage
the exploration of alternative settlement possibilities in a manner
2
not viewed as threatening the position of either party. 5
Furthermore, a judge can assist parties in clarifying what the core of
the dispute entails, weeding out peripheral and collateral issues, thus
allowing the parties to be more focused in the settlement process.
As well, judges generally reach their position because they, as
individuals, have a high degree of expertise and experience in
53
dealing with the law that governs the dispute at hand. While such
knowledge serves as the basis for the judge's ultimate decision
making power, it is also invaluable at the settlement stage. A judge
may, in an informal setting, explain to the parties involved in the
dispute some of the finer points of law that they may have
overlooked. Such information serves to clarify the issue at hand,
and in turn encourages the parties to reach a settlement among
themselves.

b. Lawyers
Those who are supportive of the pragmatic approach to dispute
resolution within the GATT lwTo argue that the increased
involvement of lawyers in a dispute resolution process that naturally
flows from the use of an adjudication-based system serves to create
a hostile and combative atmosphere surrounding a dispute. This
results in an outcome that is necessarily win-lose for the parties

51

Galanter, supra note 41 at 261. Active promotion of settlements is now the
established position in the federal judiciary. This is formally recognized in Rule 16
of the u.s. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (which is authored by a committee of
federal justices) and states that judges are allowed to "consider and take action with
respect to ... the possibility of settlement or the use of extra-judicial procedures to
resolve the dispute" (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16).
52
C. B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement (Charlottesville:
Miehe, 1986) at 206.
53
In Canada, only a lawyer who has been admitted to the bar and practiced law
for a period of no less than ten years may be considered for the judiciary. In practice,
however, few judges arrive at the bench with less than 15-20 years of experience in
the practice of law.

wro
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54

involved. However, based on the experience within the United
States, this impression of the impact a lawyer may have on the
dispute resolution process represents a somewhat limited and
erroneous portrayal of the manner in which lawyers approach
.
. 55
d1spute
reso 1ut10n.
The over-riding function of the lawyer is that of problemsolver. 56 The experience within the United States is that most, if
not all, lawyers sincerely endeavor to settle cases before they get to
trial. 57 This is evidenced by the fact that approximately ninety-two
58
percent of all civil cases settle. Thus, the role of the lawyer as
advocate within the trial or appellate setting is properly viewed as
comprising a minute segment of the duties of a lawyer within the
adjudicatory model. Mostly, the lawyer is not acting as court room
adversary, but is primarily involved as an advisor on how to prevent
and resolve disputes; and as a representative of the parties in various
dispute resolution processes, such as arbitration, mediation, or
59
negotiation. In these situations, an attorney can advance the
interests of their respective clients most effectively through the
bargaining process. 60 When a lawyer is acting in the capacity of
negotiator, little emphasis is placed on traditional legal doctrines.
54
55

Hudec, supra note 13 at 21.
In a comprehensive study of 1382 lawyers involved in civil litigation in five
federal judicial districts, Herbert Kritzer concludes that negotiations in civil cases
are marked by an orientation towards achieving a consensus among the parties: Let's
Make a Deal: Understanding the Negotiating Process in Ordinary Litigation
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991) at 131. Such a conclusion suggests
that lawyers, by their own admission, attempt to facilitate the settlement of disputes.
Thus, the fact that "a vast majority of cases settle" (closer to ninetynine percent by
Kritzer's calculations [at 3]) is as a result of, and not in spite of, the presence of
attorneys.
56
L. Risken & ]. Westerbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers (St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1987) at 53. See also Menkel-Meadow, "The Transformation of
Disputes By Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us"
(1985) Mo. J. Disp. Resol. 31 at 32, which concludes that a lawyer narrows a
dispute "because of the very process and restraints of litigation." Realizing that a
court resolution will result in a "binary win/loss ruling," lawyers will seek to
resolve the dispute at the negotiation stage, which will better meet the "real needs"
of the parties.
57
Craver, supra note 52 at 196.
58
Kritzer, supra note 39 at 162.
59
Risken & Westerbrook, supra note 56 at 53.
60
Craver, supra note 52 at 1.
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Rather, the negotiation process is "governed by the same
psychological, sociological, and communicational principles which
61
influence other interpersonal relations."
It is evident that the lawyer's main focus revolves around the
resolution of disputes in a manner which is governed less by formal,
legalist notions than those which emphasize flexibility and
compromise. In speaking of diplomacy at the international level,
Claude suggests that:
[T]he diplomatic process is most clearly in operation
when states are negotiating with each other to achieve
peaceful settlement of a dispute or agreement on a
matter of mutual concern. [emphasis added] 62

With little difficulty, one could substitute the word "states" in the
above passage, with the word "lawyers," and accurately describe the
manner in which the majority of the work a lawyer does within an
adjudicatory model. The diplomatic process is no less in operation
when such negotiations are undertaken by lawyers acting for private
parties or on behalf of states engaged in a dispute regarding
obligations under the WTO. Both the process, and the goal of that
process are the same. The diplomacy aspect of such negotiations lies
not in the forum, or in the parties, but in the exercise being carried
out by the participants.
What the above examination of the adjudication model as it
operates within the United States civil justice system demonstrates
is that the strength of an effective adjudication-based model lies in
the respect and reverence that the parties to any dispute give the
adjudicative body. Such respect and reverence is gained by the
courts who provide clear, well-reasoned and enforceable decisions.
The quality of the decisions that courts make on the relatively
few matters that come before them in turn provides incentive for
the settlement of the vast majority of cases which will never reach
this stage. As such, the main players in the adjudicatory model act
not to facilitate bringing a matter before an adjudicative body, but
primarily to actively encourage adverse parties to settle their dispute
through those channels which may be described as diplomatic in
nature, such as mediation and conciliation.

61
62

Craver, supra note 52 at 2.
Claude Jr., supra note 10 at 190.
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It is these same underlying principles which were clearly at work
in the development of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes during the Uruguay round of
trade negotiations. The result of these negotiations Is an
adjudication-based system in which the functions and powers of the
adjudicative bodies are legitimized and clarified to the point where
their presence encourages parties to engage in serious attempts to
settle disputes through diplomatic channels.
IV. THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES

The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes upholds the original GATT objective of
ensuring prompt settlement of disputes as being "essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper
63
balance between the rights and obligations of Members."
However, the rules and procedures embodied in the Understanding
differ greatly in the manner in which this objective is achieved from
the competing codes and dispute settlement arrangements which
encumbered GATT dispute resolution following the Tokyo Round
64
of negotiations. The Understanding creates a unified dispute
settlement system, binding on all members and applying to almost
all agreements and subject matter under the WTO. 65 Thus the
systems overcome the difficulty of determining which procedure
66
should apply to any given dispute.
As evidenced in the American civil justice system, the
effectiveness of an adjudication model is intrinsically linked to the
63

Article 3(3) of the Understanding. See also, World Trade Organization, The
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: A Collection of Legal Texts (Geneva: W odd
Trade Organization, 1995) at 3.
64
Stiles, supra note 15 at 7.
65
The Understanding applies to disputes brought under the Appendix 1 'covered
agreements', which include the WTO Agreement, the multilateral agreement on
goods in Annex IA, the GATS in Annex lB, the Annex IC Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and Annex 4 plurilateral rights
(applicable only to those Members which have become parties to the relevant
plurilateral agreement.)
66
Dillon Jr., supra note 12 at 373.
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quality of the adjudicative body which serves as the ultimate arbiter
of disputes. An effective adjudicative body, by its very presence,
may serve as incentive for the resolution of disputes outside the
formal courtroom setting; thus having an implicit top-down effect
on the success of the entire model. The Understanding takes great
strides towards establishing not one, but two adjudicative bodies;
the panel and the appellate body, whose combined presence is
capable of such an impact.

1. Composition and Structure of the Panels and Appellate Body
The two most important qualities which emerge from the
Understanding with regard to the composition of the panel and
appellate body are: first, the impression of independence, neutrality
and expertise of the members; and second, the requirement of a
seemingly more advanced level of legal expertise for the members
of an appellate body. These two factors go to the very heart of an
effective adjudication-based model.
If a panel or appellate body appear less than impartial, the
weight given the decision of that panel will ultimately be called into
question, as will the faith the members put in the system of dispute
67
settlement as a whole. In considering its judgment, the panel or
appellate body may not be swayed by special emphasis on factors
which a party to the dispute feels to be central to the outcome. In
order to ensure that a particular factor is addressed, a party is more
likely to negotiate directly with the adverse party, whereby they are
better able to direct the focus of the settlement of the disputed
matter.
A second important aspect is that panel and appellate body
members are to be chosen on the basis of a background which

67

Article 8(2) of the Understanding requires that panel members are to be
chosen with a view to maintaining the impression of independence of the panel
Citizens whose governments are parties to a dispute shall not serve on a panel, unless
the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. The importance of the impression of
impartiality of panelists is re-emphasized in Article 8(9). The Appellate Body is a
standing body (Article 17) whose members are appointed by the Dispute Settlement
Body to serve four year terms. The impression of judicial independence is addressed,
in so much as those appointed to the Appellate Body are not to be affiliated with any
particular government.
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entails expertise in the area of international trade or policy. 68 The
impact of having such a qualified panel and appellate body
structure are less likely to be overwhelmed by aggressive
69
lawyering. Not only will the panels and appellate bodies be better
able to respond to and diffuse aggressive legal tactics, but the very
presence of qualified adjudicators will discourage parties from
relying on such tactics. As the parties move from the panel to the
appeal stage, and their arguments become more legally focused, the
Understanding provides that adjudicators will be able to respond in
a manner that ensures control over the proceedings and the
competence of these adjudicatory bodies.
In addition to establishing a panel and appeal process which
ensures confidence in the composition of these adjudicative bodies
themselves, the Understanding also provides the means of ensurin;a
actual decisions rendered by these bodies will be of a high calibre.
The availability of a wide range of resources ensures that the
expertise that panel and appellate body members bring to bear on a
decision will be supplemented. A wealth of information pertaining
to the issue increases the likelihood that the decision will be logical,
well-reasoned and researched. This decreases the likelihood that the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will reject the decision, and,

68

Under Article 8(1), those who are appointed to panels are to possess a certain
degree of expertise in the area of international trade law or policy, having presented
a case before a panel, served on a panel, served as representative of a Member, taught
or published in the area of international law or policy, or served as a senior trade
policy official. While panel members must be 'well-qualified', this does not
necessarily entail a legal background. The same cannot be said for those comprising
the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body, under Article 17(13) is empowered to
uphold, modify or reverse the findings and conclusions of the panel; however, the
scope of this power is limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel. Members are to be chosen based on their
"recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and
the subject matter of the covered agreements generally."(Article 17(3)).
69
For a description of what is meant by "aggressive lawyering,"see note 33.
70
Article 12 of the Understanding places emphasis on the importance of
ensuring high-quality panel reports. In order to ensure that panel decisions are of a
high calibre, the Understanding allows the panel, under Article 13, to "seek
information and technical advice from any individual or body it deems
appropriate", including, under 13(2), expert opinion on certain aspects of the
matter at hand. Article 17(7) provides the Appellate body with any administrative or
legal support it may require in reaching its decision.
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perhaps more importantly, eliminates any reasonable or acceptable
rationale that a party might have for non-compliance with a
decision. 71
2. Ensuring Compliance with Panel and Appellate Body
Decisions

An equally key element in the effective functioning of an
adjudicative body is the expeditious enforcement of its decisions. 72
Since consensus is no longer required for the adoption of a panel
decision, the panel, in reaching a decision, is free to concentrate on
what the underlying law is, what legal conclusions can be drawn,
73
and how it should then apply to the facts of the case. The panel, in
order to have their report adopted, need only satisfy the appellate
body as to the quality of their decision. Under Article 17(14) of the
Understanding, a report of the appellate body,
[S]hall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally
accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate body
report within 30 days following its circulation to the
members.

This effectively ensures that, not unlike a panel decision, a ruling of
the appellate body will be acted upon by the DSB.
The measures contained Articles 21 and 22 of the
Understanding are vital to the effective functioning of an
74
adjudication-based model. Central to the authority of any court
or adjudicative body is the ability to enforce its judgments.
Important to the functioning of the system, is not that the sanction

The Dispute Settlement Body is composed of the entire WTO membership.
As per Article 16(4) the decision of a panel is to be adopted within 60 days of
the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, unless a party has notified
it decision to appeal or the DBS decides by consensus not to adopt the report. Such a
procedure, in the absence of appeal, all but ensures the adoption of a panel report.
73
G.D. Aldonas, "The World Trade Organization: Revolution in International
Trade Dispute Settlements" (1995) 50 Disp. Resol. ]. 73 at 79.
74
Articles 21 and 22 of the Understanding provide for, respectively, the
surveillance of the implementation of recommendations and rulings of decisions of
the panel or appellate body which have been adopted by the DSB and for access to
compensation and suspension of concessions where an adopted ruling is not
complied with.
7l
72

wro
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is actually employed, but that the threat of sanction itself creates
pressure to abide by an adjudicative decision. More importantly,
effective sanctions encourage parties to settle such a matter through
negotiation. Not unlike a domestic legal system, a clear
understanding of the consequences of an adverse decision will serve
as incentive within the WTO process for the settlement of disputes.
Under a domestic civil justice system, the predictability of a
result that the judiciary brings to bear on the system serves to
encourage the parties to engage in a settlement process involving
more informal and diplomatic methods. Explicit rules in the
Understanding regarding the composition and powers of the panel
and appellate body, the procedures to ensure compliance with their
decisions, and consequences for non-compliance, provide
75
predictability and stability. However, the Understanding perhaps
goes further than a domestic legal system in that it not only
encourages the use of diplomatic solutions to a dispute, but requires
that such avenues be pursued prior to resorting to the panel process.
The presence of a well-designed adjudicative structure ensures that
parties to a dispute will make a serious attempt to use diplomatic
remedies to resolve the issue, rather than an attempt to forestall an
adverse outcome.
3. Guaranteed Access to Diplomatic Remedies

The Understanding provides for four separate methods a dispute
can be settled prior to proceeding to the ?canel phase: consultation;
6
good offices; conciliation; and mediation.

i. Consultations
Article 3(7) of the Understanding makes it clear that consultation is
intended to play an important role in dispute settlement and not to
7
simply exist as a formality before the establishment of a panel.7
Article 3(7) states:

75

S. Croley & ]. Jackson, "wTo Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments" (1996) 90 Am.]. Int'! L. 193 at 193.
76
Consultation is found in Article 4 while good offices, conciliation and
mediation are found in Article 5.
77
Dillon Jr., supra note 12 at 381.
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Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its
judgment as to whether action under these procedures
would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A
solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute
and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to
be preferred.

A substantial improvement to the process of establishing the
panel is that a panel must be established unless the DSB agrees by
consensus not to do so. This is a change from the situation
prevailing prior to the Uruguay Round. The purpose is to ensure
7
that a respondent party does not stall the process. The initial stage
of meetings between the parties is the most diplomatic stage
because even though the relevant counsels and committees of the
79
WTO must be notified that consultations are being undertaken,
there is no provision for the involvement of anyone other than the
principals to the dispute. Moreover, there is no provision for the
structure or format of consultations, which are to be confidential
80
and without prejudice.
The sum of these provisions is to create an environment that
encourages full disclosure between the two parties involved. The
parties are accorded vast latitude in coming to a solution at this
stage. The only requirement of any settlement is that it be
consistent with the provisions of any relevant agreements, and that
81
it not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any member.

ii. Good Offices, Conciliation, Mediation
Unlike the consultation phase, good offices, conciliation and
mediation are employed when both parties to a dispute agree to use
8
these methods. Like the consultation process, the use of good
offices, conciliation and mediation are intended to promote full
78

Under Article 4(3), if a complaining party requests consultations, the
respondent party must agree to consult, or the complaining party may proceed
directly to a panel. As well, a complaining party may only request the establishment
of a panel after 60 days of attempts at consultations have failed (unless both parties
agree prior to 60 days that consultations have failed: (Article 4(7)).
79
Article 4(4).
80
Article 4(5).
81
Article 3(5).
82
Article 5(1).
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and frank disclosure and discussion of issues affecting the parties. In
order to achieve this objective, any discussions that occur are
confidential and without prejudice to any further proceedings. Such
confidentiality is conducive to the settlement process as the parties
are encouraged to examine every possible avenue that they feel may
contribute to a remedy. Like the consultation phase, the only
requirement of a settlement is that it comply with Article 5(5).
In the domestic sphere, a court more often than not do not side
with one party on all issues. More often, the decision reached is
based on some combination of the arguments set forth by both
parties. There is little reason to suggest that the decisions of the
panels and appellate body would differ in any significant manner.
Parties are therefore more likely to come to agreement during the
consultation, good offices, mediation and conciliatory phases of the
dispute settlement procedure where they can exert the greatest
degree of influence over the outcome.

4. Role of Panelists and Legal Counsel in the Settlement of
Disputes

i. Panelists
Like a judge in the domestic sphere, the panelist may play a positive
role in the settlement of a dispute. Under Article 5(5), the
procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may
continue while the panel process is proceeding. In this situation, the
expertise a panel member brings to the process may be invaluable in
providing the parties with a new perspective on the matter at hand.
A further opportunity for interplay between the panel and the
parties is contained in Article 15, the Interim Review Stage. At that
point, the panel submits to the parties a draft report of its primary
findings and conclusions, and the parties are able to respond with
any comments they feel are appropriate. Such a process is akin to
"communication [by a judge] to prospective litigants of what might
transpire if one of them sought a judicial resolution," which is one
of the central roles of the court under the adjudicative model. 8 3
The panel, in its final report, must address any comments made by
the parties at the interim stage. Underlying this entire exercise is the
possibility that the parties may come to a settlement at any point

83

Galanter, supra note 42 at 261.
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prior to the rendering of a final decision by the panel. As such, the
contents of an interim report provided by the panel may serve as an
inducement to the negotiation of a settlement by providing the
parties with information they previously did not consider relevant
or possess.
ii. Legal Counsel
No specific reference is made in the Understanding to the use of
legal counsel. It has, however, been suggested the quality of both
the legal counsel and the legal argument will be substantially
improved owing to the time constraints governing the panel and
84
appellate body processes.
Those who are supportive of a
diplomacy-based pragmatic approach to dispute resolution suggest
the involvement of lawyers is naturally contentious, and inconsistent
with a diplomatic resolution to a dispute. At the domestic level,
however, such an impression of the role a lawyer plays in the
resolution of a dispute is decidedly erroneous. There is no reason to
believe this impression is any less flawed at the international level.
The main duty of lawyers is to protect the interests of their
client, which at the international level is the nation. Protecting the
interests of a client, however, does not necessarily entail proceeding
to trial or acting aggressively towards an adverse party where such
action is inconsistent with a client's interests. This is especially true
when that client is involved in an on-going relationship with the
opposing party. As in the domestic sphere, the bulk of a lawyer's
time is not spent acting as adversary, but acting in a capacity
entailing traditionally diplomatic qualities: persuasion; negotiation;
and compromise. The lawyer is well suited to play a positive role in
the resolution of international disputes without resort to
adjudication.

5. Conclusion
Similar to settlement proceedings in domestic law, when parties
engage in consultation, or take advantage of the opportunity for
settlement provided by the good offices, conciliation and
mediation provisions of the Understanding, they do so in the

84

Aldonas, supra note 73 at 79.
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85

"shadow of the law." The parties must continually be conscious of
and consider the manner in which an adjudicative body will
determine the outcome of the case should the parties fail to reach a
mutually satisfactory outcome between themselves. Parties are only
conscious of the "shadow of the law" where that shadow looms
large enough to have an impact in the settlement process. The
ultimate outcome of a dispute carried through to full-blown
adjudication is only considered at the negotiation process when
there is a certain degree of predictability of outcome, and when
there is a method that decision can be enforced. The rules and
procedures contained in the Understanding have, collectively,
helped to achieve this end. The combined effect of these measures
is to create an adjudication-based system which will facilitate the
use of those methods of dispute resolution traditionally viewed as
diplomatic. Consultation, negotiation, and compromise are not
foreign to this legalistic model, but will be the means most often
employed in the settlement of disputes. The Understanding
provides further assurance that this will be the case by establishing
clear rules and procedures as to consultation, conciliation, good
offices, mediation and arbitration. The actual process of
adjudication, while lingering in the shadow of dispute resolution by
these diplomatic means, will serve to resolve only a fraction of all
disputes arising under the Understanding.

V. CONCLUSION
The rules and procedures contained in the Understanding on the
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes represent
an important step in the evolution of the GATTIWTO towards an
adjudicatory model of dispute settlement. The question remains,
however, whether or not this adjudicatory model has evolved to the
point where diplomacy-based, pragmatic methods of dispute
resolution such as negotiation and compromise should be rejected,
or whether they should be actively pursued in the resolution of
disputes. While it is too early to make such a determination, it can
at least be concluded the atmosphere the Understanding serves to
create is one bearing a striking resemblance to the adjudication
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Galanter, supra note 42 at 257; Kritzer, supra note 39 at 130.
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model as it exists within the United States. This is a model with
which the vast majority of cases never see a court room. They are
settled through such methods as are explicitly provided for in
Articles 4 and 5 of the Understanding.
Legalists are mistaken in believing the presence of a stronger
adjudicative body translates into all cases being adjudicated. Those
supportive of the diplomat camp are equally mistaken in believing
the presence of a stronger adjudicative body will negate the use of
traditional diplomatic methods of dispute settlement. Viewed in its
proper light, the movement towards an adjudication-based model
cannot be viewed as a victory for legalists and a loss for diplomats.
Instead, it should be recognized as a movement towards a better
framework for dispute settlement. This movement lends itself to a
degree of clarity and predictability which has never existed in the
history of GATT; the continued evolution of which will only serve to
better guarantee security and predictability in the multilateral
trading system.

